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Cover Page Footnote 
1. Robert V. Simpson, Jr., graduated from Colgate University (BA, 1967), Vermont Law School (JD, 1978) 
and served as a prosecutor in Chittenden County (Vermont) between 1979 and 81 and again between 
1994 and 2006. 2. In Re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, No. 2010-479 (S. Ct. Vt. Filed 
December 29, 2010) 3. The prosecutors’ first argument is that Vermont judges lack legal authority to 
impose these preconditions. This dispute over whether judges have the legal authority to impose these 
restrictive preconditions has become, in part, a battle by proxy between law professors. Prosecutors rely 
on the analysis of George Washington University Law Professor, Orin Kerr, who argues that judges do not 
have legal authority to impose conditions on how officers will execute search warrants. Orin S. Kerr, Ex 
Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1241 (2010) Two national organizations, 
the Criminal Law Reform Project of the ACLU Foundation and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
responded to the prosecutors’ reliance on Professor Kerr by countering with the March 2011 reply to 
Professor Kerr by Professor Paul Ohm. Brief of ACLU and EFF, filed in Docket No. 2010-479 on June 17, 
2011 at 15. Professor Ohm contends these conditions are not only lawful, but necessary. Paul Ohm, 
Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1, 4 (March, 
2011) 4. The Vermont conditions are: 1. As a condition for receiving a search warrant to search the 
subject computer, the State cannot rely upon the "plain view doctrine" to seize any electronic records 
other than those authorized by this warrant. That is, any digital evidence relating to criminal matters other 
than the identity theft offenses, may not be seized, copied, or used in any criminal investigation or 
prosecution of any person. 2. Inspection and investigation of the subject computer must be done by 
either an independent third party or specially trained computer personnel who are not involved in the 
investigation while staying behind a firewall, that is, in the absence of other agents of the State, and 
subject to a ban on copying or communicating to any person or the State any information found on the 
subject computer other than digital evidence relating to identity theft offenses. 3. Any digital evidence 
relating to the offenses must be segregated and redacted before it is provided to the State, no matter how 
intermingled it is. 4. If the segregation is performed by State computer personnel, it is a condition of this 
warrant that the computer personnel will not disclose to the State investigators or prosecutors any 
information other than that which is the target of the warrant, that is, digital evidence of the identity theft 
offenses. 5. The search protocol employed must be designed to uncover only the information for which 
the State has probable cause, that is the aforesaid alleged offenses, and only that digital evidence may be 
provided to the State. Techniques to focus the search should include but are not limited to, specific time 
periods relevant to the alleged criminal activity, key word searches, and limiting the search to specific file 
types. 6. The government has at its disposal sophisticated hashing tools that allow identification of well-
known illegal files (such as child pornography) that are not at issue in this case. These and similar search 
tools may not be used without specific authorization by the court. 7. Information relevant to the targeted 
alleged activities may be copied to other media to provide to State agents. No other digital evidence may 
be so copied. 8. The government must return non-responsive data, keeping the court informed about 
when it has done so and what it has kept. 9. Any remaining copies of the electronic data must be 
destroyed absent specific judicial authorization to do otherwise. 10. Within the time specified in the 
warrant, the State must provide the issuing officer with a return disclosing precisely what data it has 
obtained as a consequence of the search, and what data it has returned to the party from whom it was 
seized. The return must include a sworn certificate that the government has destroyed or returned all 
copies of data that it is not entitled to keep. In re: Application for Search Warrant Eric Gulfield Computer, 
Chittenden Superior Court , Amended Order at 1 (Dec. 22, 2010) Printed Case (PC) 3-4 5. Judge Michael 
Kupersmith is a respected trial judge with well-over twenty years of experience in Vermont’s Criminal 
Division. 6. In re: Application for Search Warrant Eric Gulfield Computer, Chittenden Superior Court, 
Amended Order at 1 (Dec. 22, 2010) Printed Case (PC) 3-4 “The application to search the computer 
belonging to Eric Gulfield is granted subject to the conditions listed herein. In setting these conditions, the 
Court has been guided by United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 9th Cir. (2009).” 
7. The 9th Circuit is the largest Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States. It covers federal 
courts in Arizona, California, Nevada, Montana, Oregon, Idaho, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii as well as 
Guam and the Northern Marianna Islands. 8. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,579 F.3d 
989 (9th Cir.2009) 9. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1000 10. Id 11. Chief Judge Kozinski summarized the 
“guidance” that magistrates “must be vigilant” in observing: 1. Magistrates should insist that the 
government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. 2. Segregation and 
redaction must be either done by specialized personnel or an independent third party. If the segregation is 
to be done by government computer personnel, it must agree in the warrant application that the computer 
personnel will not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of the 
warrant. 3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information as well 
as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora. 4. The government's search protocol must 
be designed to uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only that information 
may be examined by the case agents. 5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully 
possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done 
so and what it has kept. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th 
Cir.2009) (internal citations omitted) 12 US v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 621 F3d 1162,1176 (9th 
Cir 2010) (CDT III) 13. CDT III at 1180 14. CDT III at 1178 15. In the Matter of the United States Of 
America’s Application For A Search Warrant To Seize And Search Electronic Devices From Edward 
Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1139 (W.D. Washington, 2011) 16. According to Detective Lt. Kris Carlson 
of the Burlington (Vermont) Police Department, an officer with long experience as a computer forensic 
investigator, Vermont police officers have specific objections to nearly all of the CDT conditions. But their 
overriding general objection is that, although they well understand that computers can contain huge 
amounts of private information, they see no reasonable justification for the imposition of vastly greater 
restrictions on searches of computers than restrictions on searches of homes, which are generally 
considered the most private of private places. Recorded interview with Detective Lt. Kris Carlson, Director 
of Vermont’s Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force in Burlington, Vermont on July 19, 2011 
17. Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 Va. L. Rev. 
1, 3, 8 (March, 2011) 18. 97 Va. L. Rev. 8 19. Bryan Weir, It’s (Not So) Plain to See: The Circuit Split on the 
Plain View Doctrine in Digital Searches, 21 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L. J. 83, 113 (Fall 2010); James Saylor, 
Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital 
Searches, 79 Fordham Law Review 2809 (May, 2011); James Stinsman, Computers and Searches, 
Rethinking the Applicability of the Plain View Doctrine, 83 Temple Law Review 1097, 1120 (Summer 2011) 
and Matthew Dodovich, The Plain View Doctrine Strikes Out In Digital File Searches, 6 ISLP 659, 691 
(Summer, 2011) 20. E.g., summaries of statements from customers and neighbors 21. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has said that “probable cause” means that there is a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence 
of a crime is at a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 238 (1983) 22. The officer must also 
prepare an application but that document merely gives the judge an outline of the substantive information 
developed in the warrant and the supporting affidavit. 23. The judge, in turn, “must” grant the warrant if 
there is probable cause to believe that the evidence of the crime identified in the warrant is located at the 
place identified in the warrant. The applicable Court Rules are Fed. R. Crim. P 41 (d) (1) which says: (1) In 
General. After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge – or if authorized by Rule 
41(b), a judge of a state court of record – must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for 
and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device; and Vt. R. Crim P 41 (c) which says 
(1) Probable Cause. A judicial officer shall issue the warrant if the judicial officer is satisfied that there is 
probable cause to believe that grounds for the application exist based upon an affidavit or affidavits or 
sworn testimony or both.” 24. The warrant which is now before the Vermont Supreme Court says: “To: Det. 
Michael Warren and any Vermont Law Enforcement Officer You are hereby commanded to search:” 
(emphasis in the original) 25. “The application to search the computer belonging to E.G., is granted 
subject to the conditions listed herein. In setting these conditions, the Court has been guided by United 
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 9th Cir. 2009).” Amended Order, In re: Application 
for Search Warrant E_G_ Computer, December 22, 2010 at 3 26. “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 27. Horton v. 
California, 496 US 128 (1990) 28. Crimes Act 1914 Section 3F - http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/
consol_act/ca191482/s3f.html 29. “The problem can be stated very simply: There is no way to be sure 
exactly what an electronic file contains without somehow examining its contents either by opening it or 
looking, using specialized forensic software, keyword searching or some other such technique. But 
electronic files are generally found on media that also contain thousands or millions of other files among 
which the soughtafter data may be stored or concealed. By necessity, government efforts to locate 
particular files will require examining a great many other files to exclude the possibility that the sought-
after data are concealed there.” CDT II, 579 F3d at 1004. 30. See, Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a 
Digital World, 119 Harv. L .Rev. 531, 568-71 (2005) 31.“Thus, the scope of a lawful search is ‘defined by the 
object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found.” Maryland 
v. Garrison, 480 US 79, 84(1987) (quoting US v. Ross, 456 US 798, 824 (1982) The scope of the search in 
the hypothetical is limited by the “object” of the search – evidence of the crime of sale of marijuana, the 
crime identified in the warrant and a crime for which the officer had probable cause. The officer exceeded 
the scope of the warrant because he was looking for evidence of the crime of sexual exploitation of a 
child – a crime that was not identified in the warrant, and a crime for which he did not have probable 
cause. 32. “It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating 
evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the 
evidence could be plainly viewed.” Horton, 496 US at 136. 33. 579 F3d at 997-999, 1005 34. 579 F3d 998 
35. Id 36. 579 F3d 1006 37. U.S. v. Farlow, 2009 WL 4728690 (D. Me. 2009, slip opinion p. 6 fn3) 38. In Re 
Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, No. 2010-479 (S. Ct. Vt. Filed December 29, 2010), affidavit of 
Detective Michael Warren in support of application for search warrant, Printed Case (PC) 8-9 39. The 
investigator, Detective Warren, does have training and experience in computer forensic investigations. Id. 
7 40. Vermont officer/examiners are taught to confine the scope of their searches to the evidence 
delineated in the search warrant. If they do open a file that reveals evidence of another crime “in plain 
view,” they apply for another warrant. Interview with Detective Lt. Kris Carlson, Director of Vermont’s 
Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force in Burlington, Vermont on July 19, 2011 41. 97 Va. L. 
Rev. 5 42. Id 43. Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 
97 Va. L. Rev. 11 (March, 2011) 44. 97 Va. L. Rev. 4 45. Whether the place to searched, is a car, a home or 
a computer, the officers always “seize” the place to be searched first in the sense that they take control of 
that place before they begin searching through non-incriminating objects and information for evidence of 
the crime identified in the warrant. The big difference in computer searches is that the search of the 
copied hard drive usually takes places offsite. 46. 97 Va. L. Rev. 7 47. 97 Va. L. Rev. 8 48. US v. Upham, 
168 F3d 532, 535 (1st Cir., 1999) 49. Fed. R. Evid. 401; Vt. R. Evid. 401 50. Fed. R. Evid. 402; Vt. R. Evid. 
402 51. Weeks v. US, 232 US 383 (1918) 52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 343 (1961) 53. US v. Herring, 555 US 
135, 141 (2009) 54. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 591 (2006) 55. Id. 56. “Our cases show but-for 
causality is only a necessary, not sufficient, condition for suppression.” 547 US at 592 57. According to 
one source, there are roughly 175,000 “suppression hearings” held in our courts in the U.S. each year on 
Fourth Amendment issues alone. Joel Samaha, Criminal Procedure, 7 th edition 361 (2008) 58. U.S. v. 
Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 950(S.D. Texas, 2009) 59. 579 F3d at 1006 60. 2. Inspection and investigation of 
the subject computer must be done by either an independent third party or specially trained computer 
personnel who are not involved in the investigation while staying behind a firewall, that is, in the absence 
of other agents of the State, and subject to a ban on copying or communicating to any person or the State 
any information found on the subject computer other than digital evidence relating to identity theft 
offenses. 3. Any digital evidence relating to the offenses must be segregated and redacted before it is 
provided to the State, no matter how intermingled it is. 4. If the segregation is performed by State 
computer personnel, it is a condition of this warrant that the computer personnel will not disclose to the 
State investigators or prosecutors any information other than that which is the target of the warrant, that 
is, digital evidence of the identity theft offenses. 61. The federal law says: “A search warrant may in all 
cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve 
such warrant, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and 
acting in its execution.” 18 USC 3105 Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (c) (5) likewise says the 
warrant must be executed by a law enforcement officer: “. . . The warrant shall be directed to a law 
enforcement officer of the state of Vermont authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof. 
The warrant shall command the officer to search the person or place named for the property or other 
object specified and seize the property or object and, if appropriate, the person specified.” 62. Vermont 
Rule of Evidence 502; Federal Rule of Evidence 502 63. E.g., Comcast, Yahoo! 64. E.g., businesses that 
store and process electronic billing information for physicians 65. 18 USC 2703 (g) 66. U.S. Attorneys 
Criminal Resource Manual, part 59-Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by 
Third Parties, 28 C.F.R. Part 59, § 59.1 67. Investigators may proceed by search warrant – but only when 
using a subpoena would “substantially jeopardize the investigation. Id. 68. I worked for roughly fifteen 
years as a prosecutor in Vermont. I am aware of only two cases when it was necessary to use an 
independent third party to execute the search warrant in order to sort out material that was protected by 
attorneyclient privilege. One of the two cases involved a computer warrant. (U.S. v. Hunter, fn. 70 – below) 
69. U.S. v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 232-36 (D. Me. 2011) 70. U.S. v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 
1998) involved a computer search warrant of records of an attorney who published a legal newsletter. The 
search raised both attorney-client privilege issues and Privacy Protection Act questions. The US Attorney 
for Vermont designated a team consisting of an attorney and officers who were not involved in the 
criminal investigation (“taint team”) to conduct the search and sort out evidence that the investigating 
officers were authorized to view under the warrant. 71. CDT II, 579 F3d 989, 1013 (Callahan, Circuit Judge, 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) 72. Despite the apparent requirements of Rule 41 of the Vermont 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Condition 2 does not require the “independent expert” to be a law 
enforcement officer. 73. The case is US v .Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Fla. 1995). The delay is reported 
in Black v. US, 172 FRD 511, 514 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 74. 172 FRD 516 75. New York State Police 
conducted the initial investigation and then gave information that they had to Burlington, Vermont Police 
because it appeared the person suspected of the crime lived in Burlington. In Re Appeal of Application for 
Search Warrant, No. 2010-479 (S. Ct. Vt. Filed December 29, 2010) PC 5- 11 76. Id 77.PC 6-7 78. 
Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital 
Searches, 79 Fordham L. Rev. at 2856 79. 79 Fordham L. Rev. at 2857 80. Id. 
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“PREEMPTIVE SUPPRESSION” – JUDGES 
CLAIM THE RIGHT TO FIND DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE BEFORE IT IS 
EVEN DISCOVERED 
 
Bob Simpson, JD1 
Champlain College 
 
Vermont state prosecutors have asked2 the Vermont Supreme Court to end a state 
trial judge’s practice3 of attaching conditions4 to computer warrants. The 
Vermont judge’s5 conditions are drawn from five conditions6 established in the 
2009 decision of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals7 in the Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc. case (CDT II).8 This is the first time the validity of the “CDT 
conditions” will be decided by a state court of final jurisdiction in the United 
States. 
The CDT II majority reacted to what it termed “an obvious case of deliberate 
overreaching by the government in an effort to seize data as to which it lacked 
probable cause.”9 Determined “to guard against such unlawful conduct in the 
future10”,Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, author of the majority opinion, set out five 
conditions, or “guidance,11” that magistrate judges were to require law 
enforcement officers to agree to, before the judge signed a computer warrant.   
The 9th Circuit withdrew these conditions from the majority opinion in 
September 2010 (CDT III).  But, it reaffirmed its conclusion that government 
agents had violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 
the CDT case.  And, it repeated its concern that  the “pressing need of law 
enforcement  for broad authorization to examine electronic records … creates a 
serious risk that every warrant for electronic information will become, in effect, 
a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant.”12   
The CDT conditions did not disappear when they were withdrawn from the 
majority opinion in CDT III. Chief Judge Kozinski made them part of his 
concurring opinion, apparently to emphasize their continuing importance.13  
Four other judges joined in his concurring opinion.14 Five months after that, a 
federal magistrate in the Western District of Washington reaffirmed the 
continuing vitality of  the  CDT conditions when he refused to sign a computer 
warrant after federal prosecutors refused to agree to the two most controversial  
of these  pre-conditions.  Prosecutors seeking a warrant to search computers for 
evidence of trafficking in counterfeit goods and criminal copyright infringement 
refused to:  (1) “forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine” (CDT Condition1) 
and (2) conduct the search with “a filter team to separate from the investigative 
agents information that is outside the scope of the warrant” (CDT Condition 2). 
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The judge responded by refusing to grant the search warrant.15 
This article focuses on these two conditions (CDT Conditions 1 and 2). I contend 
they are gratuitously damaging to fair and effective law enforcement in 
Vermont16 and anywhere else they are adopted. 
  
 CDT Condition 1:  This condition requires all “case agents” (case 
investigators) seeking a warrant to search computers to “waive reliance 
upon the plain view doctrine” before a judge will sign the warrant. This 
amounts to what I call “preemptive suppression.” 
 The CDT majority evidently concluded that granting case investigators 
judicial authority to search computers will always create an intolerable 
risk these officers will abuse this authority. The majority presumed that 
investigators would use the warrant as “cover” to convert the right to 
search for evidence of the specific crime identified in the warrant into 
an illegal “general warrant” enabling them to look through every file on 
the computer for everything that may be damaging to the computer user. 
The majority decided to act preemptively to eliminate this risk before 
the search even takes place.  It did so by ordering magistrate judges in 
the 9th Circuit to require case investigators and prosecutors to agree, as 
a condition to obtaining a computer warrant, that the government will 
never use any “plain view” evidence obtained during the course of the 
computer search in any criminal case – regardless of whether evidence 
is obtained lawfully. As a result, evidence of other potentially serious 
crimes (e.g., murder, kidnapping, extortion) is “suppressed” – excluded 
from use in any prosecution– before it is even gathered.  
 CDT Condition 2:  Case investigators applying for a computer warrant 
must also agree, as a condition to obtaining the warrant, they will play 
no further role in the search of the computer(s) identified in the warrant.  
The “segregation” of digital evidence that tends to prove, or disprove, 
the crimes identified in the warrant from evidence that is not “the target 
of the warrant” is to be done, either by “an independent third party” 
expert or law enforcement computer experts. In other words, the case 
investigators, the people who know the most about the specific criminal 
activity that is the subject warrant, can play no part in the search and no 
role in deciding what digital evidence is relevant to their investigation. 
This will mean delay, added expense and increase the likelihood that 
the search will be broader than necessary.  It will also increase the 
likelihood that important evidence will be overlooked.   
 
Professor Paul Ohm of the University Colorado Law School sees the CDT  
conditions as part of a “trend emerging” among federal magistrate judges who 
are attempting to “creatively superintend” how computer warrants are drafted 
and executed.17 Professor Ohm sees the CDT conditions as an example of the 
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“subtler, more nuanced approaches” judges must adopt in order to solve the 
“special problems” created by computer searches.18 Professor Ohm is not alone. 
He is joined by at least four other law review commentators who support CDT 
conditions 1 and 2.19   
I have a different view. There is no dispute that computer searches pose a special 
challenge for police, prosecutors and judges who must insure that searches for 
digital evidence do not overwhelm individual rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, CDT  conditions 1 and 
2 not only require preemptive suppression; but, they also bar case investigators 
from taking any part in deciding whether particular pieces  of digital evidence 
are relevant to crimes they are investigating. These conditions are (1) not 
“subtle;” (2) not “nuanced” and (3) not supported by either the evidence, or the 
law.   
I begin (below) with a brief summary of the process of obtaining a search 
warrant, followed by an explanation of the “special problem” that Conditions 1 
and 2 are intended to address.  The article goes on to explain why Condition 1, 
which bars the prosecution from using an entire class of evidence before the 
computer warrant is even signed, is an unnecessary, radical remedy that is not 
founded on the evidence or the law. The second part of this two-part article deals 
with Condition 2. It explains that by barring investigators from taking part in 
the search, Condition 2, again without any legal basis, has the unwarranted 
effect of treating all digital evidence obtained through a computer warrant as 
though it is protected by attorney-client privilege.  This creates more problems 
than it solves because it means unnecessary expense, delay and loss of relevant 
evidence.  
 
THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING A SEARCH WARRANT  
On a basic level, the process for obtaining a warrant to search a computer is the 
same as the process for obtaining a warrant to search a home or any other place 
where a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” The officer assigned 
to investigate the crime (e.g., sale of cocaine) must write an affidavit that sets 
out facts and circumstances20 developed during the officer’s investigation that 
demonstrate there is probable cause21 to believe that evidence of the crime under 
investigation is located on the suspect’s computer, which is, in turn, located at a 
specific place. The investigating officer must also write a proposed search 
warrant that identifies “with particularity” the place to be searched and the 
evidence to be seized.  The “on call” prosecutor then reviews these documents22.  
Once the prosecutor is satisfied that the documents meet legal requirements (e.g., 
Fourth Amendment and state and federal rules governing search warrants), the 
prosecutor contacts the “on call” judge.  
The judge then conducts an independent review of the officer’s documents.  If 
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the judge is satisfied that the documents are legally sufficient, the judge will 
sign23 the warrant authorizing the investigating officer24 to conduct  a search of 
the place described in the warrant for the evidence described in the warrant. In 
the computer warrant case now before the Vermont Supreme Court, the Vermont 
judge attached the CDT conditions to the warrant after he signed it.25  Prosecutors 
then appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court. 
 
THE “PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE” 
The Fourth Amendment26  to the US Constitution prohibits “government agents” 
(e.g., police officers, federal law enforcement agents) from searching for and/or 
seizing evidence that is located in a place where an individual has a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” unless the government agent has a warrant to conduct 
the search – a warrant authorized by a neutral judge.    
There are, however, several well-recognized judicially-created exceptions to this 
“warrant requirement.” The so-called “plain view doctrine” is one of these 
exceptions27.  It says that a law enforcement officer does not need a warrant to 
seize evidence if: (1) the officer is legally in a position to observe something -  
because he has a search warrant to search a computer, for instance; (2) that 
officer  has the lawful right to access the object  in “plain view” – when he opens 
a file during the computer search, for instance, and (3) the incriminating nature 
of the evidence is “immediately apparent” – the file she opens is an image of a 
child being sexually assaulted, for instance. Under the plain view doctrine, the 
officer is entitled to seize (copy) the image without a warrant because the original 
warrant put him in a position to observe the file legally and the incriminating 
nature of the opened file is immediately apparent.   
The plain view doctrine is not radical. Other countries have adopted rules similar 
to this US rule allowing a law enforcement officer who is lawfully in a position 
to observe, and seize, evidence whose “incriminating nature is immediately 
apparent.”  In Australia, for example, Crimes Act 1914, Section 3F (1) (d) (ii) 
authorizes an officer executing a search warrant for evidence of a particular 
crime to seize evidence that is not listed in the warrant if s/he   “believes on 
reasonable grounds” it is “evidential material in relation to another offense that 
is an indictable offence.”28   
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WARRANTS TO SEARCH COMPUTERS CAN BECOME “GENERAL 
WARRANTS” ENABLING THE GOVERNMENT TO SEARCH 
COMPUTERS FOR ANYTHING ITS AGENTS CARE TO LOOK FOR 
Computer searches create the potential for officers to take advantage of the fact 
that a computer user can hide evidence of a crime anywhere on a computer 29  
and turn legal warrants into illegal “general warrants30.”  That is, they can exploit 
warrants that give them legal authorization to search computers for evidence that 
a specific person has committed a specific crime and use these warrants as a 
means to rummage through a person’s computer in search of evidence of any 
crime. 
Assume an officer has probable cause to believe there is evidence of possession 
of marijuana on X’s computer and that he obtains a valid warrant to search a 
computer for evidence of sale of marijuana. Assume also that the officer suspects 
that the computer’s owner has committed another crime – a more serious crime 
such as sexual exploitation of a child – but lacks the “probable cause” that would 
give him a legal basis under the Fourth Amendment to obtain a second warrant 
to lawfully search for the sexual exploitation evidence.  This officer, can, 
nonetheless, lawfully go through every file on the computer looking for evidence 
of sale of marijuana, while hoping, at the same time, that he will uncover 
evidence of this crime, or, for that matter, any other crime.  
 Next, assume the officer does open a file that contains an image that makes it 
immediately apparent that the computer user has engaged in the sexual 
exploitation of a child.  The officer can use the “plain view” exception to the 
Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement to justify “seizing” this evidence 
of this more serious crime. The officer can then use the evidence of child 
exploitation that he found in “plain view” to establish the “probable cause” 
necessary to obtain a second search warrant to lawfully look for more evidence 
that the computer user has engaged in sexual exploitation of a child.   
On its face, this is all legal; but, a violation of the computer owner/user’s Fourth 
Amendment rights may have already occurred.   
 The original “marijuana warrant” gave the officer the legal right to open all files 
to search for evidence of the sale of marijuana.  But, suppose the officer never 
had any interest in the marijuana case and he never had any intent to search X’s 
computer for marijuana evidence, or that he lost interest in the marijuana case 
shortly after the warrant was granted.  Instead, he used the “probable cause” he 
did have, solely as a means to get a warrant that gave him access to X’s computer. 
Suppose he then opened every file to search for evidence of child sexual 
exploitation, or other crimes for which he did not have probable cause.  
Under those circumstances, the officer violated X’s Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from unreasonable searches from the time he began executing 
(conducting) the search because he deliberately exceeded the scope of the 
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warrant (which limited him to searching for “marijuana evidence”31) as soon as 
he began the search.  He did not have the right to rely on the plain view doctrine.  
Opening the file put him a position to see the exploitation evidence in “plain 
view.” But, he did not get into the position to view the “exploitation evidence” 
legally32. He opened the file in which X had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
unlawfully.  He opened it knowing he was looking for evidence of a crime for 
which he did not have probable cause – a crime that was not identified in the 
warrant he did have. It was an illegal warrantless search, which, in turn, made 
the “plain view” seizure of the evidence exploitation illegal.   
The officer executing the computer warrant made a conscious decision to violate 
the Fourth Amendment by exploiting: (1) the authority of the warrant; (2) the 
unique nature of digital evidence and (3) the plain view doctrine to search for, 
and seize, evidence he which he knew he did not have probable cause.  
 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF WIDESPREAD POLICE 
MISCONDUCT THAT WOULD SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF 
CONDITIONS 1 AND 2 
The unique nature of digital evidence (including the capacity to store enormous 
amounts of information) does create the potential for officers who are executing 
computer warrants to violate the Fourth Amendment and convert them into 
“general warrants” that can result in massive violations of privacy. But, this 
potential for privacy violations will not harden into the reality of a privacy 
violation unless an officer deliberately violates the law.  So far, no court, or 
commentator, has come forward with evidence that justifies the presumption, 
implicit in Conditions 1 and 2, that all investigating officers who execute 
computer warrants will deliberately violate the Fourth Amendment by searching 
for evidence of crimes for which they do not have probable cause and then 
purporting to lawfully seize this evidence under the plain view doctrine.   
Chief Judge Kozinski wrote the CDT conditions in response to one incident of 
“unlawful conduct” involving federal agents investigating the use of steroids in 
Major League Baseball.  According to Judge Kozinski’s majority opinion in 
CDT II, at least one of the agents who executed computer search warrants at drug 
testing facilities in California and Nevada violated the privacy rights of hundreds 
of individuals33  by deliberately searching for evidence of crimes for which he 
did not have probable cause; and then when he found this evidence, exploited 
the “plain view doctrine” to seize it illegally.  
Judge Kozinski explained that he had no quarrel with the proposition that 
because computer users can hide evidence of a crime anywhere on a computer, 
officers may have to carefully examine every file to insure they find all evidence 
they were authorized to search for.34  But, he predicted that this meant that 
“anything the government chooses to seize” will eventually “come into plain 
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view.” And this, in turn, he said, created a “powerful incentive” for officers to 
“seize more rather than less” and then take “everything back to the lab” to see 
what investigators “may stumble upon.”35  
To eliminate this “powerful incentive” to bring everything  into “plain view” in 
order to see what investigators” may stumble upon,” Judge Kozinski told 
magistrate judges in the Ninth Circuit to insist that case investigators “waive 
reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases” (Condition 1) 
before these judges approved a warrant to search a computer36. 
The effect of Condition 1 was stunning.  It insured that no digital evidence 
obtained through the plain view doctrine in a computer search could ever be 
used in any criminal prosecution, regardless of whether it was obtained legally- 
in fact, without any specific consideration of whether it was obtained legally.   
Why? The Court was clearly frustrated by what it saw as the cynical exploitation 
of the doctrine by case investigators in the CDT case. But why order preemptive 
suppression of all digital evidence that may ever be seized under the plain view 
doctrine in any computer search warrant case in the Ninth Circuit based on a 
single instance of “deliberate overreaching” by officers?  What is the evidence 
of widespread abuse of the plain view doctrine in computer searches that justifies 
establishing what is, in effect, a judicial presumption that officers who execute  
computer search warrants will deliberately violate the Fourth Amendment by 
exploiting the plain view doctrine?  
The Ninth Circuit did not cite any.  No one else has either.   
Judge John Woodcock, Chief U.S. District Judge in Maine, pointed out there 
was no evidentiary basis for such a presumption when he rejected, as “unwise,” 
the CDT II conditions just four months after the decision was issued: 
The CDT protocols impose extraordinary precautions against 
police misconduct for all applications for a warrant to search a 
computer, assuming misconduct will be the rule, not the 
exception. There is no evidence that police disobedience of 
search warrant limitations is so widespread to compel such 
onerous pre-issuance procedures, and at the very least the more 
traditional remedies should be tried first.  
The judicial directive to forswear in advance the plain view 
doctrine, placed in a different context, is equivalent to 
demanding that a DEA investigative team engaged in the search 
of a residence for drugs promise to ignore screams from a closet 
or a victim tied to a chair.37 
To see just how unwise Condition 1 is, please consider this hypothetical based 
on the warrant now being considered by the Vermont Supreme Court.  The 
warrant authorizes officers to search for evidence of one crime – “identity theft.”  
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It authorizes “Det. Michael Warren,” the detective who conducted the 
investigation and wrote the affidavit in support of the warrant, to search the 
premises and seize “records” in “whatever form they are found” including 
records stored on computers.38   
Assume Detective Warren searches paper records pursuant to the warrant – e.g., 
a three-ring notebook or a stack of papers – for evidence of the crime of identity 
theft.  Assume further that it becomes “immediately apparent” as he turns a page 
that he is looking at a list of illegal drug sales.  He would be authorized under 
the plain view doctrine to seize that record and use it as the basis for an affidavit 
to secure another warrant to search the premises for evidence of the additional 
crime of delivery of illegal drugs.  But,  assume instead, that he opens a  Word 
file on a copy of a hard drive39, seized pursuant to the same warrant and it is 
“immediately apparent”  that he is looking at a list of the same illegal drug sales.  
He will have to ignore this digital evidence.  This is because, under Condition 1, 
he cannot “seize copy or use” the cocaine transactions evidence “in any criminal 
investigation or prosecution of any person” because it was seized from a 
computer under the plain view doctrine.    
Detective Warren has not violated the Fourth Amendment in conducting either 
the paper search, or the computer search.  In the search of the paper “records,” 
evidence obtained under the plain view doctrine may be used to obtain a search 
warrant to conduct an independent investigation into cocaine sales.  The paper 
record will also be admissible for consideration by a jury if charges of cocaine 
sale are brought.  However, the same evidence in digital form obtained during 
the search of computer “records” cannot be used by the prosecution for any 
reason.  Under Condition 1, it has been suppressed before it is even found.   
There is no evidence of widespread abuse by case investigators executing 
computer warrants in Vermont40.  Despite this, the Vermont Judge has adopted 
CDT Condition 1 – a condition founded on the “evidence-free” presumption that 
investigators will deliberately violate the Fourth Amendment when they execute 
computer warrants.      
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THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE IMPOSITION OF THE CDT 
CONDITIONS  
Professor Ohm makes a different, yet equally startling claim. He focuses, not on 
officer misconduct in executing computer warrants, but on the invalidity of the 
warrants themselves.  Professor Ohm says that “almost every” computer warrant 
violates the Fourth Amendment.41  Under his analysis, judges not only have the 
legal authority to impose CDT II type conditions, they have the obligation to do 
so in order to “compensate for the lack of probable cause and particularity – not 
merely to ensure reasonable execution – in almost every computer case.”42 
Professor Ohm’s tone is apocalyptic.  He says “computer search warrants are the 
closest things to general warrants we have confronted in the history of the 
Republic”43 and that CDT conditions “are designed to cure the manifest lack of 
probable cause and particularity in almost every computer case.” (Professor 
Ohm’s emphasis)44   
Surely it is an overstatement to say that “almost every” one of the thousands of 
computer warrants issued by state and federal judges in the U.S. every year are 
not supported by affidavits establishing a “fair probability” that evidence of the 
crime(s) identified “with particularity” in the warrant will be found on the 
computer devices at a place, identified with “particularity,” in the warrant.   
As it turns out, Professor Ohm is not arguing that judges are routinely granting 
computer warrants that lack particularity and probable cause.  Instead, he seems 
to be saying that we have reached a point at which the sheer volume of private, 
non-relevant information “commingled” with evidence of the crime identified in 
the warrant is so overwhelming that, as a matter of law, the sheer volume of this   
“innocent” information somehow dilutes “particularity” and extinguishes the 
legal vitality of the finding of probable cause that justified the warrant in the first 
place.  
Officers executing a search warrant will always observe45 “non-incriminating” 
objects, or information, as they search for evidence of crimes identified in the 
warrant whether it is a search of a car for evidence of illegal drugs, a house for 
evidence of stolen jewelry or paper business records for evidence of fraud.   
Officers will always have to “segregate” information that tends to prove, or 
disprove, the crime(s) identified in the warrant from large amounts 
“commingled” information that is not related to the crimes identified in the 
warrant.  
Professor Ohm is right, though, when he says that officers searching a computer 
will have the opportunity to view vast amounts of “sensitive” commingled 
evidence that will exceed, by many orders of magnitude, the quantity of 
commingled evidence they would be likely to view in executing any other type 
of warrant.46 He is also right that the “commingling” of vast amounts of “non-
incriminatory” information with information that is evidence of a crime is an 
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important part of the “special problem” of computer searches.   
But, to date, judges have not concluded, as Professor Ohm evidently has, that the 
fact that computer warrants create an opportunity for case investigators to view 
a vast amount of private, non-relevant data   as they search for evidence of the 
crime identified in the warrant, somehow translates into a “manifest” lack of 
probable cause or an “intractable failure of particularity.”47    
As the First Circuit put it, a search of computer is not “inherently more intrusive” 
than a search of a home.  And, according to the court,  an affidavit establishing 
probable cause to believe there is evidence of the crime identified somewhere on 
a computer device establishes a constitutionally “sufficient chance of finding 
some needles in the computer haystack” to meet the “particularity” requirement:  
As a practical matter, the seizure and subsequent off-premises 
search of the computer and all available disks was about the 
narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to 
obtain the images. A sufficient chance of finding some needles 
in the computer haystack was established by the probable-cause 
showing in the warrant application; and a search of a computer 
and collocated disks is not inherently more intrusive than the 
physical search of an entire house for a weapon or drugs.48 
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the US Supreme Court, 
simply cannot be read to support Professor Ohm’s claims that the sheer volume 
of commingled information on computers somehow extinguishes the judicial 
findings of “particularity” and the probable cause that justified the warrant in the 
first place.  According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment places just two basic 
limitations on executive branch officers who seek authority to: (1) search places, 
where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) seize items 
believed to be evidence of a crime the officers are investigating.  
That is, the affidavit of the executive branch officers seeking the warrant must 
convince the judge through facts and circumstances set out in the affidavit that 
it is “fairly probable” that evidence of the crime the officers are investigating 
will be found in  each  place the officers are asking to  search.  And, the search 
warrant, itself, must “particularly” describe both the place the officers want to 
search and the items the officers want to seize.  That is all.  
Probable Cause – Judges do not have the power to “reject computer warrants” 
because, as Professor Ohm seems to argue, the volume of non-relevant 
information likely to be commingled with the evidence of the crime is so vast 
that it somehow extinguishes probable cause.   Rule 41 (c) (1) of the Vermont 
Rules of Criminal Procedure says that if a judge is satisfied that an officer’s  
affidavit  demonstrates there is probable cause to believe that evidence of the 
crime identified in the warrant will be found in the place identified in the warrant, 
then, the judge “shall” issue the warrant.  Likewise, Rule 41 (d) (1) of the Federal 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(4) 
31 
Rules of Criminal Procedure says the judge “must issue” a warrant on a showing 
of probable cause. There is no provision in either rule that allows the judge to 
ignore the fact there is a fair probability that there is evidence of a crime on a 
computer (or anywhere else) simply because the evidence of a crime is 
commingled with vast amounts of non-relevant information.  
Particularity – Judges also lack the power to add CDT II – inspired conditions 
in an effort to cure what Professor Ohms refers to as “the intractable failure of 
particularity.” Once the judge reviewing a computer warrant (or any other 
warrant) has made a finding of probable cause, s/he has the duty, and authority, 
to make sure the warrant “particularly describes:” (1) the location of the 
computer to be searched and (2) the evidence of the particular crime(s) the case 
investigators have established probable cause to search for and seize:  
“The Fourth Amendment, however, does not set forth some 
general “particularity requirement.” It specifies only two 
matters that must be “particularly describ[ed]” in the warrant: 
“the place to be searched” and “the persons or things to be 
seized.” We have previously rejected efforts to expand the scope 
of this provision to embrace unenumerated matters.”  US v. 
Grubbs, 547 US 90, 97 (2006)  
 
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR CONDITION 1  
It is axiomatic that a court must have a legal basis for its decisions. There is also 
no question that evidence which tends to prove, or disprove, “any fact of 
consequence”49 in a trial, or hearing – is the lifeblood of our justice system.  
Federal and state law says that “all relevant evidence is admissible” unless its 
admissibility is limited by the U.S. Constitution, the relevant state constitution, 
statute or other court rules.50  But, there is no rule – constitutional, statutory, or 
evidentiary – that authorizes a judge to dictate, as a condition to granting a 
computer warrant that all evidence obtained through the plain view doctrine 
during execution of that warrant, shall be inadmissible, now, and forever more, 
regardless of whether of this evidence has been obtained legally. 
The only possible basis for a rule requiring exclusion of all digital evidence 
obtained under the plain view doctrine is the so-called “exclusionary rule” that 
prevents the prosecution from using evidence that has been obtained illegally in 
its  “direct case” in any criminal trial.   No version of the “exclusionary rule” 
authorizes suppression of evidence before it has been gathered, or even 
discovered.   
The US Supreme Court adopted the “exclusionary rule” for use in federal courts 
nearly one hundred years ago51 to deter law enforcement officers from violating 
the U.S. Constitution when they gathered evidence and to preserve public 
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confidence in the integrity of the judiciary by insuring that evidence that was 
obtained in violation of the Constitution was not used to convict people in our 
courts.  The exclusionary rule has evolved to authorize both federal and state52 
trial judges to prohibit the prosecution from introducing evidence at trial that 
might otherwise be used to convict a defendant because the government obtained 
the evidence illegally. 
In other words, the evidence is “suppressed” because the prosecution would not 
have the evidence “but for” the illegal actions of the officers who obtained the 
evidence (a search that violates the Fourth Amendment for example).53  
 The U.S. Supreme Court has warned that suppression of evidence should be a 
“last resort” not a “first impulse”54 and that those seeking to apply the 
exclusionary rule face a “high obstacle” because suppression of evidence exacts 
a “costly toll” on “truth-seeking and law enforcement55.” At the very least, 
according to the Court, the judge ordering suppression must not suppress 
evidence unless there has been some misconduct by law enforcement officers in 
obtaining this evidence.  That is, s/he must be satisfied that the evidence that is 
to be suppressed would not have been discovered “but for” some misconduct by 
officers who gathered the evidence56.  
Yet, Condition 1 requires “no fault” suppression. Under Condition 1, evidence 
of a crime that is seized under the plain view doctrine during execution of a 
computer warrant may never be used.  The suppression of this evidence is not 
based on any evidence that officers have violated the law.  Instead, it is based on 
a presumption that officers, who are trusted to act lawfully in executing any other 
type of warrant, will violate the law when they execute a computer search 
warrant.  
 
“TRADITIONAL REMEDIES” DO WORK IN COMPUTER CASES 
Finally, while there are bound to be isolated instances of police misconduct in 
computer search cases, there is no need to preemptively exclude an entire class 
of evidence in anticipation of them. There is good reason to believe that what 
Chief Judge Woodcock referred to as “traditional remedies” will be adequate to 
address these individual cases once there is evidence that they have taken place. 
The potential for abusing the plain view doctrine existed well before computer 
searches. Officers with a warrant to search for small items that could be hidden 
virtually anywhere in a home (e.g., illegal drugs) could use the warrant as a 
pretext to search for evidence for which they did not have probable cause.   They 
could go through every inch of the home under the authority of the “drug 
warrant;” but, with the intent to look for evidence of other crimes for which they 
did not have probable cause and then seize this “extra-warrant” evidence when 
it came into “plain view.”  
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For decades, courts in the United States have dealt with allegations of such police 
misconduct the same way they dealt with all other allegations of Fourth 
Amendment violations.  They do not order general exclusion of an entire class 
of evidence before it is even discovered as Condition 1 requires.  Instead, they 
address specific claims of misconduct related to a specific search after that 
search has been completed. They routinely rule on these specific claims at 
hearings on motions to return property, or motions to suppress evidence57. 
These remedies worked well in the CDT case, itself.  And defense experts have 
had little difficulty using metadata to convince judges “after the fact” that 
government agents had decrypted, searched and seized files that were outside 
the scope of the computer warrants.58  There is simply no evidence that these 
“traditional remedies” will not continue to work in computer searches.   
 
 “STEP AWAY FROM THE COMPUTER!” – JUDGES CLAIM THE 
RIGHT TO BAR POLICE “CASE INVESTIGATORS” FROM ANY 
INVOLVEMENT IN CONDUCTING COMPUTER SEARCHES  
CDT Condition 2 is prompted by the same presumption as CDT II Condition 1 
– law enforcement “investigators” cannot be trusted to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment in executing computer searches. It provides: 
“2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by 
specialized personnel or an independent third party. If the 
segregation is to be done by government computer personnel, it 
must agree in the warrant application that the computer 
personnel will not disclose to the investigators any information 
other than that which is the target of the warrant.59” 
 
The Vermont version of CDT Condition 2 breaks the Condition into three parts60; 
but, it says essentially the same thing. “State investigators” (case investigators) 
and “prosecutors,” those who know the most about the crime that prompted the 
search of the computer, cannot be involved in the search of the computer. 
Moreover, they will have no say in what digital evidence is ultimately 
determined to be relevant to their investigation. Investigators must leave that 
determination to court-approved computer forensic experts who know nothing 
about case at the outset and are barred from communicating with investigators 
while these independent experts conduct the search. 
Federal law and Vermont state law generally require law enforcement officers 
to execute search warrants.61 Usually the case investigator, the law enforcement 
officer who is investigating the crime identified in the warrant, is directly 
involved in the execution of the warrant. That is no longer the case for computer 
warrants. The effect of condition 2 is to require law enforcement officers to use 
a process for searching a suspect’s computer that up until now has been reserved 
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for the rare situations when information on the suspect’s computer is believed to 
be protected by attorney-client privilege62. Requiring use of this process in all 
computer searches will not limit the scope of computer searches; but, it will 
significantly undermine the effectiveness of these searches.   
 
TWO BROAD CATEGORIES OF COMPUTER SEARCHES  
For purpose of discussion here, there are two broad categories of computer 
searches – (1) searches of computers controlled by so-called “disinterested third 
parties” who have no involvement in the crime described in the warrant other 
than the fact that evidence of that crime is probably stored on their computers 
(e.g., internet service providers, laboratories, physician’s offices, etc.) and (2) 
searches of computers used by those suspected of the crime identified in the 
warrant.  
There is seldom a good reason for case investigators to be directly involved in 
conducting searches of computers in Category 1.  On the other hand, there is 
almost always a good reason for investigators to be directly involved in 
conducting searches in Category 2 – computers used by suspects.   
 
SEARCHING COMPUTERS CONTROLLED BY “DISINTERESTED 
THIRD PARTIES” 
There are two common circumstances where the need to protect privacy rights 
of those who are not suspects in a criminal investigation makes it reasonable to 
have the computer search conducted by third party experts who are not involved 
in law enforcement.  
First, under the Stored Communications Act, state and federal case investigators 
routinely serve search warrants on providers of electronic communications 
services (ECS)63 and remote computing services (RCS)64 to obtain “content 
information” that is relevant to crimes identified in the warrant.  Employees of 
the ECS or RCS are legally authorized to execute these search warrants without 
law enforcement officers being present.65 
Second, third party privacy concerns often make it more reasonable to use a 
subpoena in place of a search warrant. Evidence of a crime is often located on 
computers owned and controlled by persons or entities (e.g., laboratories, 
hospitals, “professionals” such as physician’s offices) that otherwise have no 
relationship to the crime under investigation. In such cases, it usually makes 
sense to attempt to obtain this information by serving a subpoena rather than 
executing a search warrant.  
For instance, U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines66 (guidelines), require case 
investigators to use subpoenas when “documentary material” (including 
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computer files) that is the target of the search is commingled with other, non-
relevant information, that is held by “disinterested third parties.” i.e., those who 
are either not suspects in the crime under investigation, or unrelated to suspects.  
These guidelines cite the need to protect “privacy interests” in situations which 
are a core concern in computer searches – situations where execution of a search 
warrant “may require examination of private papers within the scope of the 
warrant, but not themselves subject to seizure.” Using a subpoena, rather than a 
search warrant67, gives the “disinterested third party” the opportunity to conduct 
the search of its own records.  
These guidelines can accommodate privacy concerns without jeopardizing 
effective law enforcement. There is no reason to believe disinterested third 
parties will destroy evidence of a crime that happens to be on their computers.  
Since they know their computer systems best, it makes sense for them to search 
their own computers, after consulting with case investigators who have served 
them with a subpoena. 
 
SEARCHING COMPUTERS USED BY THOSE SUSPECTED OF THE 
CRIMES IDENTIFIED IN THE WARRANT  
  However, the majority of computer warrants in Vermont involve searches of 
computers used by the person suspected of the crime identified in the warrant. 
The suspect is not “disinterested.”  He may be reasonably expected to hide and, 
if given the opportunity, destroy evidence of his crime. Plainly, the suspect 
cannot search his own computer.   
Who then should conduct the search of the suspect’s computer? The obvious 
choice is the case investigator – the officer investigating the case that prompted 
the warrant.  But, on rare occasions,68  evidence that is subject to seizure under 
a search warrant is commingled with information that may be protected by 
attorney-client privilege. On those occasions, independent third parties must take 
the place of case investigators in conducting the search.    
Assume, for instance, it is likely that those executing the warrant will encounter 
confidential communications (e.g., emails69) between the person who is 
suspected of the crime identified in the warrant and his attorney. Officers 
investigating the underlying crime are prohibited from involvement in the 
search. This is because the law prohibits law enforcement officers, in particular, 
from viewing this highly confidential information. Officers must wait until an 
independent legal expert who is not involved in the underlying investigation, 
typically either an outside legal expert (“special master”) or a government “taint 
attorney”, reviews the information and separates information that is protected by 
the privilege from information that is not70. This independent expert is, in turn, 
barred from communicating with case investigators. This serves to eliminate any 
perception that privileged information is being exploited by these investigators 
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to fortify their case against the client/suspect.  
 
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR TREATING ALL SEARCHES OF A 
SUSPECT’S COMPUTER AS THOUGH THE ATTORNEY- CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE APPLIES 
Unfortunately, Conditions 2 engrafts a process onto computer that treats all the 
information on every suspect’s computer as though it is protected by attorney-
client privilege. A process that was used once or twice a decade in Vermont, will, 
instead, be used once or twice a week. Independent experts, not case 
investigators, will conduct all searches of a suspect’s computer despite the fact 
that virtually all of the information that is subject to these searches: (1) is not 
protected by privilege and (2) is lawfully subject to review by law enforcement 
case investigators.   
Unlike “taint attorneys” who begin well-prepared to answer the legal question 
of whether information is covered by the attorney-client privilege; the 
independent experts conducting the computer searches will be ill-prepared to 
identify information that “relates to” the crime identified in the warrant. This is 
because: (1) they are required to start with no knowledge of the underlying 
investigation and (2) they are prohibited from communicating with the case 
investigators who could provide this knowledge.  Whether information “relates 
to” the crimes identified in the warrant is largely a question of fact, not law.  
Under the terms of Conditions 2, the computer search expert is deprived of many 
of these facts.   
 
CONDITION 2 – ADDED EXPENSE, UNNECESSARY DELAY AND 
UNFOCUSED SEARCHES 
The goal in executing computer warrants (or any other search warrant) is to 
search for, and seize, relevant evidence – evidence that tends to prove, or 
disprove, crimes that are identified in the warrant - as quickly as possible.   
Case investigators (“agents involved in the investigation”) know more about 
what information is likely to be relevant to the case than anyone else.  For 
example, they know: the chronology of events in the crime, locations, identities 
of witnesses, relative importance of witnesses, relationships between witnesses, 
circumstances of witness statements, credibility of witnesses, reliability of 
witness statements, code words, nicknames, etc. Much of this information may 
not even be included in the warrant affidavit – a document that is designed to 
cite facts and circumstances that “establish probable cause” as concisely as 
possible. Knowledge of this information is undeniably helpful in identifying 
information that is relevant under the warrant. Yet, the primary purpose of 
Condition 2 is to prevent the case investigators from having any involvement in 
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the search, or seizure of this evidence in any case, including searches of 
computers used by a suspect. They will play no part in deciding what digital 
evidence is relevant to their investigation.  
Again, this practice may be legally required in the rare cases where evidence of 
a crime is likely to be commingled with information protected by attorney-client 
privilege. But, there is no legal basis for it in the overwhelming majority of 
computer search cases. Under Condition 2, though, officers involved in any 
criminal investigation, including rapidly developing investigations involving 
violent crimes such as murder, attempted murder, sexual assault etc., will have 
to promise, as a condition for obtaining a computer warrant, to stand aside and 
wait for an independent expert to select the digital evidence these case 
investigators may use.  
This process will be very expensive. As Judge Consuelo Callahan, one of the 
CDT II judges who concurred, in part, and dissented, in part, put it: 
With respect to using an in-house computer specialist to 
segregate data, the majority's guideline essentially requires that 
law enforcement agencies keep a “walled-off,” non-
investigatory computer specialist on staff for use in searches of 
digital evidence. To comply, an agency would have to expand 
its personnel, likely at a significant cost, to include both 
computer specialists who could segregate data and forensic 
computer specialists who could assist in the subsequent 
investigation. The alternative would be to use an independent 
third party consultant, which no doubt carries its own significant 
expense. Both of these options would force law enforcement 
agencies to incur great expense, perhaps a crushing expense for 
smaller police departments that already face tremendous budget 
pressures.”71  
These conditions will delay investigations. Some of these delays may endanger 
the public – as, for instance, when officers investigating a recent homicide are 
required to step aside, say nothing, and wait for an independent expert, who 
knows nothing about their investigation, try to “get up to speed" on their 
investigation before searching a murder suspect’s computer and selecting the 
evidence the investigating officers will then be allowed to use in continuing their 
investigation.      
There will always be delay – even in straightforward cases like the identity theft 
case that brought these issues to the Vermont Supreme Court.  The court-
approved expert, who must at least have a rudimentary knowledge of the crime 
of identity theft, and its essential elements, will still have to be assigned (or 
retained72), and given time to review the affidavit and warrant to assess what 
digital evidence might “relate to” the crime identified in the warrant. Then the 
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independent expert will conduct the search and “segregate” the evidence that 
s/he alone believes is relevant to the crime(s) identified in the warrant. Finally, 
the independent expert will provide the selected evidence to the case investigator 
without discussion of any other digital information the expert may have found 
on the computer. 
Delays in cases involving complex transactions and relationships can be 
absurdly long. In one case where a judge did require the independent expert 
(“special master”) to:  (1) filter evidence covered under the attorney-client 
privilege and (2) decide what digital evidence was relevant to the crimes listed 
under the search warrant, the trial in the case was delayed for at least two and 
one half years. 73  Delays resulting from review by a special master can 
“effectively deprive the government of any access to any of the seized 
information.”74   
Independent experts do not have to mean delay. In fact, prior to Condition 2, 
they meant greater speed and efficiency. Specially-trained law enforcement 
officers who are experts in searching computers are an important asset to 
criminal investigations.  These officers work with case investigators. The fact 
that the expert starts with little knowledge of the case does not result in delay 
because the expert routinely consults with case investigators to decide what 
digital information is relevant to the case. Their skill in searching computers 
speeds the process. Their ability to consult with case investigators enables them 
to narrow the scope of the search, and sharpen their focus on only the most 
relevant, case specific information, thereby further speeding the process.  
This can no longer happen under Conditions 2 because the expert in searching 
computers is prohibited from consulting with the case investigator. The expert 
must remain behind a “firewall.” Since the expert cannot discuss the case with 
the investigating officer while conducting the search, the expert will have to rely 
on the information in the affidavit(s) and the search warrants, itself, to determine 
what digital evidence the expert will seize and eventually give to investigators. 
Because the affidavit and warrant will not provide the expert with all of the facts 
and circumstances developed during the investigation, the search will be less 
efficient and less effective.  
Again, the affidavit supporting the warrant in the case before the Vermont 
Supreme Court is a good example.  The case involves investigations of identity 
theft by police agencies in two states.75 Yet, aside from the names of 
investigators, the affidavit, which easily establishes probable cause, contains 
only three names. One was the name of the 84-year-old New York resident who 
was the victim of the attempted ID theft. The second was the name of the owner 
of the property at an address in Vermont – an address that a bogus application 
for a credit card had falsely identified as the victim’s address. The third was the 
name of the innocent subscriber assigned to the IP address that was used to 
submit the bogus application. This person’s “open” wireless network was 
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evidently used by the thief.76   
Although there were multiple attempts to obtain different credit cards through 
false representations, the affidavit contains details of just one attempt77. The case 
investigator would have more names and many more details.  Because of 
Condition 2, an independent expert “segregating” digital evidence found on the 
suspect’s computer will not have this additional information. The expert, who 
must remain behind a “firewall,” barred from communicating with case 
investigators, will not have the names of contacts and details of the attempts to 
obtain other credit cards.   
This, in turn, creates a substantial likelihood that the computer search expert will 
not have key words, such as the names of other banks and credit card companies 
he needs to identify digital evidence that “relates to” attempts to steal the 
victim’s identity. In addition, the expert will not have the names of friends and 
associates of the victim who may have knowledge of, or access to, the victim’s 
identification information and who may have intentionally, or unwittingly, given 
this information to the thief. Again, because he does not know the relevance of 
these names, he will not search for them, or recognize their significance if he 
happens upon them. It is important to point out that the expert will also not have 
names of others who had access to the computer, which the would-be-thief 
apparently used to make the bogus application. The expert will not even know 
the names of others who had access to the open wireless network used in the 
attempt.  
In short, the independent expert is likely to miss relevant evidence – evidence 
that tends to prove, or disprove, the suspect’s guilt.  
Computer searches are likely to be broader, and, in that sense, more intrusive.  
This is because it is more likely that the independent expert will pursue leads 
(and review files) unnecessarily. For instance, in the identify theft case before 
the Vermont Supreme Court, the expert is likely to come across digital 
information on the suspect’s computer that appears to be relevant because it deals 
with credit or financial transactions.  Some will be relevant. Some will not. The 
independent expert will not be able to contact the investigator, who would have 
sufficient knowledge of relevant financial transaction to advise the expert on 
whether particular transactions “relate to” the underlying crime.  Without this 
advice, the expert is likely to unnecessarily investigate transactions that have 
nothing to do with the crime identified in the warrant.   
CONDITION 2 DOES NOT LIMIT GOVERNMENT “DISCRETION” 
James Saylor, another commentator who supports CDT conditions, argues in the 
Fordham Law Review that conditions such as Conditions 2 are “perhaps the 
most important” of the CDT II –inspired conditions78 because they will deprive 
“the government” of the “discretion” that enables “the government” to conduct 
“dragnet searches.”79   
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Of course “the government” doesn’t search computers.  It searches computers 
through people who work as its agents. The independent expert/ “special master” 
who conducts the search will be no less a “government agent” than the case 
investigator, or any other law enforcement officer, who executes a search 
warrant. The special master’s authority to conduct the search will be derived 
from the very warrant that the case investigator obtained – but was barred by 
Conditions 2 from executing. His/her goal in conducting the search will be same 
as that of the case investigator – to search for, and seize, evidence that tends to 
prove, or disprove, crimes that are identified in the warrant – as quickly as 
possible.   
The fact is Condition 2 does nothing to limit “discretion” or the potential for 
abuse of discretion. It simply substitutes “government agents” (independent 
experts) who know nothing about the case for “government agents” (case 
investigators) who do know something about the case. Unless judges come to the 
unlikely conclusion that all computers are constitutionally immune from search 
because of the potential for abuse, there is going to be someone “from the 
government” who will be conducting computer searches. 
 
CONDITION 1 MAKES CONDITION 2 UNNECESSARY 
Condition 2 does have the unwarranted effect of treating all evidence that is 
subject to computer searches as though this evidence is covered by the attorney-
client privilege. But, concern for attorney-client privilege is not what prompted 
Condition 2. Ultimately, the concern that prompted Condition 2 is the same 
concern that prompted Condition 1. It is the belief that case investigators are 
more likely to deliberately violate the Fourth Amendment and turn computer 
searches into “general warrants” than other “government agents.”  Mr. Saylor 
put it this way: 
Appointing a special master assures that any authority to view 
files potentially outside the scope of the warrant is granted to an 
official unconnected to the investigation and uninterested in 
“extend [ing] a general exploratory search from one object to 
another until something incriminating at last emerges.”80 
There is still no evidence to support this concern. But, the fact is, even if such 
evidence existed, the existence of Condition 1 would still make Condition 2 
unnecessary.  
Condition 1 requires the prosecution to pledge, as a condition of obtaining the 
computer warrant, to never use digital evidence seized under the plain view 
doctrine while executing the warrant. This eliminates the incentive for any 
government agent, including case investigators, to rummage for evidence of 
crimes for which s/he knows there is no probable cause. There is no incentive to 
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engage in an unlawful “general exploratory search” and seize evidence under the 
plain view doctrine because government agents (case investigators) have already 
agreed as Condition 1 for obtaining the warrant that they will never use such 
evidence.  
Condition 1 is “unwise.”  But, it is also easy to enforce. Even if an investigator 
were tempted to violate Condition 1, s/he would not be successful. Prosecutors 
must always prove of the source of a piece of evidence in order to authenticate 
and admit it at trial. Assume case investigators have agreed to Condition 1 in 
order to obtain a computer warrant to search for evidence of identity theft. It 
would be virtually impossible to later authenticate and admit evidence of another 
crime e.g., evidence of possession of child pornography that had been seized 
under the plain view doctrine during execution of the identity theft warrant. It 
would be obvious to the judge and defense counsel during the authentication 
process that prosecution has violated Condition 1 by seeking to admit evidence 
of possession of child pornography that was obtained during execution of a 
warrant that authorized government agents to search solely for evidence of 
identity theft. 
Condition 2 prohibits investigators from taking any role in executing the 
computer warrants they have obtained. It is based on the unwarranted 
presumption that investigators are more likely than other government agents to 
exploit the plain view doctrine.  Condition 2 is unnecessary because Condition 
1 already eliminates both the incentive, and the ability, to exploit this doctrine.  
In fact, Condition 2 is more than unnecessary, it is “worse than useless.” It 
prohibits investigators from playing any role in reviewing evidence seized under 
the warrant they have obtained, and deciding what pieces of digital evidence are 
relevant to the crimes they are investigating. In doing so, Condition 2 increases 
expense, delay and the likelihood that relevant evidence will be overlooked, 
while at the same time adding nothing to the protection from potential privacy 
violations that Condition 1 already provides.   
 
1  Robert V. Simpson, Jr., graduated from Colgate University (BA, 1967), 
Vermont Law School (JD, 1978) and served as a prosecutor in Chittenden 
County (Vermont) between 1979 and 81 and again between 1994 and 2006.  
2 In Re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, No. 2010-479 (S. Ct. Vt. Filed 
December 29, 2010) 
 
3 The prosecutors’ first argument is that Vermont judges lack legal authority to 
impose these preconditions. This dispute over whether judges have the legal 
authority to impose these restrictive preconditions has become, in part, a battle 
by proxy between law professors. Prosecutors rely on the analysis of George 
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Washington University Law Professor, Orin Kerr, who argues that judges do not 
have legal authority to impose conditions on how officers will execute search 
warrants.  Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 
Va. L. Rev. 1241 (2010) Two national organizations, the Criminal Law Reform 
Project of the ACLU Foundation and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
responded to the prosecutors’ reliance on Professor Kerr by countering with the  
March 2011 reply to Professor Kerr by Professor Paul Ohm. Brief of ACLU and 
EFF, filed in Docket No. 2010-479 on June 17, 2011 at 15. Professor Ohm 
contends these conditions are not only lawful, but necessary.  Paul Ohm, Massive 
Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 Va. L. 
Rev. 1, 4 (March, 2011) 
 
4  The Vermont conditions are: 
1. As a condition for receiving a search warrant to search the subject 
computer, the State cannot rely upon the "plain view doctrine" to seize 
any electronic records other than those authorized by this warrant. That 
is, any digital evidence relating to criminal matters other than the 
identity theft offenses, may not be seized, copied, or used in any criminal 
investigation or prosecution of any person. 
2. Inspection and investigation of the subject computer must be done by 
either an independent third party or specially trained computer personnel 
who are not involved in the investigation while staying behind a firewall, 
that is, in the absence of other agents of the State, and subject to a ban 
on copying or communicating to any person or the State any information 
found on the subject computer other than digital evidence relating to 
identity theft offenses. 
3. Any digital evidence relating to the offenses must be segregated and 
redacted before it is provided to the State, no matter how intermingled it 
is. 
4. If the segregation is performed by State computer personnel, it is a 
condition of this warrant that the computer personnel will not disclose 
to the State investigators or prosecutors any information other than that 
which is the target of the warrant, that is, digital evidence of the identity 
theft offenses. 
5. The search protocol employed must be designed to uncover only the 
information for which the State has probable cause, that is the aforesaid 
alleged offenses, and only that digital evidence may be provided to the 
State. Techniques to focus the search should include but are not limited 
to, specific time periods relevant to the alleged criminal activity, key 
word searches, and limiting the search to specific file types. 
6. The government has at its disposal sophisticated hashing tools that 
allow identification of well-known illegal files (such as child 
pornography) that are not at issue in this case. These and similar search 
tools may not be used without specific authorization by the court. 
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7. Information relevant to the targeted alleged activities may be copied 
to other media to provide to State agents. No other digital evidence may 
be so copied. 
8. The government must return non-responsive data, keeping the court 
informed about when it has done so and what it has kept. 
9. Any remaining copies of the electronic data must be destroyed absent 
specific judicial authorization to do otherwise. 
10. Within the time specified in the warrant, the State must provide the 
issuing officer with a return disclosing precisely what data it has 
obtained as a consequence of the search, and what data it has returned to 
the party from whom it was seized. The return must include a sworn 
certificate that the government has destroyed or returned all copies of 
data that it is not entitled to keep. 
In re: Application for Search Warrant Eric Gulfield Computer, Chittenden 
Superior Court , Amended Order at 1 (Dec. 22, 2010)  Printed Case (PC) 3-4  
 
5 Judge Michael Kupersmith is a respected trial judge with well-over twenty 
years of experience in Vermont’s Criminal Division.  
6  In re: Application for Search Warrant Eric Gulfield Computer, Chittenden 
Superior Court, Amended Order at 1 (Dec. 22, 2010) Printed Case (PC) 3-4 “The 
application to search the computer belonging to Eric Gulfield  is granted subject 
to the conditions listed herein. In setting these conditions, the Court has been 
guided by United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 9th 
Cir. (2009).” 
 
7 The 9th Circuit is the largest Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in the United 
States.  It covers federal courts in Arizona, California, Nevada, Montana, 
Oregon, Idaho, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii as well as Guam and the 
Northern Marianna Islands.   
 
8 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.2009) 
9  CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1000 
10  Id 
11  Chief Judge Kozinski summarized the “guidance” that magistrates “must be 
vigilant” in observing: 
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the 
plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.  
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized 
personnel or an independent third party. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(4) 
44 
                                                                                                                      
 If the segregation is to be done by government computer personnel, it 
must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will 
not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is 
the target of the warrant. 
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction 
of information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other 
judicial fora.  
4. The government's search protocol must be designed to uncover only 
the information for which it has probable cause, and only that 
information may be examined by the case agents. 
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess 
it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed 
about when it has done so and what it has kept.   
 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th 
Cir.2009) (internal citations omitted) 
 
12 US v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 621 F3d 1162,1176 (9th Cir 2010)  
(CDT III)   
13  CDT III  at 1180 
14 CDT III  at 1178 
15 In the Matter of the United States Of America’s Application For A Search 
Warrant To Seize And Search Electronic Devices From Edward Cunnius, 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138, 1139 (W.D. Washington, 2011) 
 
16   According to Detective Lt. Kris Carlson of the Burlington (Vermont) Police 
Department, an officer with long experience as a computer forensic investigator, 
Vermont police officers have specific objections to nearly all of the CDT 
conditions. But their overriding general objection is that, although they well 
understand that computers can contain huge amounts of private information, they 
see no reasonable justification for the imposition of vastly greater restrictions on 
searches of computers than restrictions on searches of homes, which are 
generally considered the most private of private places.  Recorded interview with 
Detective Lt. Kris Carlson, Director of Vermont’s Internet Crimes Against 
Children (ICAC) Task Force in Burlington, Vermont on July 19, 2011 
17   Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of 
Magistrate Judges, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3, 8 (March, 2011) 
 
18  97 Va. L. Rev. 8  
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19 Bryan Weir, It’s (Not So) Plain to See: The Circuit Split on the Plain View 
Doctrine in Digital Searches, 21 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts.  L. J. 83, 113 (Fall 
2010);  James Saylor, Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine 
from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches,  79 Fordham Law 
Review 2809 (May, 2011);  James Stinsman, Computers and Searches, 
Rethinking the Applicability of the Plain View Doctrine, 83 Temple Law Review 
1097, 1120 (Summer 2011) and Matthew Dodovich, The Plain View Doctrine 
Strikes Out In Digital File Searches, 6 ISLP 659, 691 (Summer, 2011) 
20  E.g., summaries of statements from customers and neighbors 
21 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that “probable cause” means that there is a 
“fair probability” that contraband or evidence of a crime is at a particular place.  
Illinois v. Gates,  462 US 213, 238 (1983) 
 
22 The officer must also prepare an application but that document merely gives 
the judge an outline of the substantive information developed in the warrant and 
the supporting affidavit.  
23 The judge, in turn, “must” grant the warrant if there is probable cause to 
believe that the evidence of the crime identified in the warrant is located at the 
place identified in the warrant. The applicable Court Rules are Fed. R. Crim. P 
41 (d) (1) which  says: 
(1) In General. After receiving an affidavit or other information, a 
magistrate judge – or if authorized by Rule 41(b), a judge of a state 
court of record – must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to 
search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a 
tracking device; 
  and  Vt. R. Crim P 41 (c) which says  
(1) Probable Cause. A judicial officer shall issue the warrant if the 
judicial officer is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that 
grounds for the application exist based upon an affidavit or affidavits or 
sworn testimony or both.” 
 
24 The warrant  which is now before the Vermont Supreme Court says: 
     “To:  Det. Michael Warren and any Vermont Law Enforcement  Officer  
      You are hereby commanded to search:”  (emphasis in the original) 
 
25 “The application to search the computer belonging to E.G., is granted subject 
to the conditions listed herein. In setting these conditions, the Court has been 
guided by United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 9th 
Cir. 2009).”   Amended Order, In re: Application for Search Warrant E_G_ 
Computer, December 22, 2010 at 3 
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26 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”  
27  Horton v. California, 496 US 128 (1990) 
28  Crimes Act 1914 Section 3F - 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca191482/s3f.html 
29  “The problem can be stated very simply: There is no way to be sure exactly 
what an electronic file contains without somehow examining its contents either 
by opening it or looking, using specialized forensic software, keyword searching 
or some other such technique. But electronic files are generally found on media 
that also contain thousands or millions of other files among which the sought-
after data may be stored or concealed. By necessity, government efforts to locate 
particular files will require examining a great many other files to exclude the 
possibility that the sought-after data are concealed there.” CDT II, 579 F3d at 
1004. 
 
30  See, Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L 
.Rev. 531, 568-71 (2005) 
 
31 “Thus, the scope of a lawful search is ‘defined by the object of the search and 
the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found.” Maryland 
v. Garrison, 480 US 79, 84(1987)  (quoting  US v. Ross,  456 US 798, 824 (1982) 
The scope of the search in the hypothetical is limited by the “object” of the search 
– evidence of the crime of sale of marijuana, the crime identified in the warrant 
and a crime for which the officer had probable cause.  The officer exceeded the 
scope of the warrant because he was looking for evidence of the crime of sexual 
exploitation of a child – a crime that was not identified in the warrant, and a 
crime for which he did not have probable cause.   
 
32 “It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of 
incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in 
arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed.” Horton, 
496 US at 136. 
33   579 F3d at 997-999, 1005 
 
34 579 F3d 998 
35  Id 
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36  579 F3d 1006 
37  U.S. v. Farlow, 2009 WL 4728690 (D. Me. 2009, slip opinion p. 6 fn3)  
38  In Re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, No. 2010-479 (S. Ct. Vt. 
Filed December 29, 2010),  affidavit of Detective Michael Warren  in support of  
application for search warrant, Printed Case (PC) 8-9 
 
39  The investigator, Detective Warren, does have training and experience in 
computer forensic investigations. Id. 7    
40  Vermont officer/examiners are taught to confine the scope of their searches 
to the evidence delineated in the search warrant.  If they do open a file that 
reveals evidence of another crime “in plain view,” they apply for another 
warrant. Interview with Detective Lt. Kris Carlson, Director of Vermont’s 
Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force in Burlington, Vermont on 
July 19, 2011 
41 97 Va. L. Rev. 5  
42 Id 
43 Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of 
Magistrate Judges, 97 Va. L. Rev. 11 (March, 2011) 
 
44  97 Va. L. Rev. 4  
 
45 Whether the place to searched, is a car, a home or a computer, the officers 
always “seize” the place to be searched first in the sense that they take control 
of that place before they begin searching through non-incriminating objects and 
information for evidence of the crime identified in the warrant.  The big 
difference in computer searches is that the search of the copied hard drive usually 
takes places offsite.  
46 97 Va. L. Rev. 7 
47 97 Va. L. Rev. 8 
48  US v. Upham, 168 F3d 532, 535 (1st Cir., 1999) 
 
49 Fed. R. Evid. 401; Vt. R. Evid. 401 
50  Fed. R. Evid. 402; Vt. R. Evid. 402 
51  Weeks v. US, 232 US 383 (1918)  
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52  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 343 (1961) 
53 US v. Herring, 555 US 135, 141 (2009) 
54  Hudson  v. Michigan, 547 US 586,  591 (2006)  
 
55 Id. 
56 “Our cases show but-for causality is only a necessary, not sufficient, condition 
for suppression.” 547 US at 592 
 
57 According to one source, there are roughly 175,000 “suppression hearings” 
held in our courts in the U.S. each year on Fourth Amendment issues alone.  Joel  
Samaha, Criminal Procedure, 7th edition  361 (2008) 
 
58 U.S. v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 950(S.D. Texas, 2009) 
59  579 F3d at 1006 
60 2. Inspection and investigation of the subject computer must be done by either 
an independent third party or specially trained computer personnel who are not 
involved in the investigation while staying behind a firewall, that is, in the 
absence of other agents of the State, and subject to a ban on copying or 
communicating to any person or the State any information found on the subject 
computer other than digital evidence relating to identity theft offenses. 
3. Any digital evidence relating to the offenses must be segregated and redacted 
before it is provided to the State, no matter how intermingled it is. 
4. If the segregation is performed by State computer personnel, it is a condition 
of this warrant that the computer personnel will not disclose to the State 
investigators or prosecutors any information other than that which is the target 
of the warrant, that is, digital evidence of the identity theft offenses. 
 
61  The federal law says: “A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of 
the officers mentioned in its direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve 
such warrant, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring 
it, he being present and acting in its execution.” 18  USC 3105 
  
Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (c) (5) likewise says the warrant must 
be executed by a law enforcement officer: “. . . The warrant shall be directed to 
a law enforcement officer of the state of Vermont authorized to enforce or assist 
in enforcing any law thereof. The warrant shall command the officer to search 
the person or place named for the property or other object specified and seize the 
property or object and, if appropriate, the person specified.” 
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62 Vermont Rule of Evidence 502; Federal Rule of Evidence 502 
63  E.g., Comcast, Yahoo! 
64 E.g., businesses that store and process electronic billing information for 
physicians  
65 18 USC 2703 (g) 
66  U.S. Attorneys Criminal Resource Manual, part 59-Guidelines on Methods of 
Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Parties, 28 C.F.R. Part 59, § 
59.1 
67 Investigators may proceed by search warrant – but only when using a subpoena 
would “substantially jeopardize the investigation. Id. 
68 I worked for roughly fifteen years as a prosecutor in Vermont.  I am aware of 
only two cases when it was necessary to use an independent third party to execute 
the search warrant in order to sort out material that was protected by attorney-
client privilege. One of the two cases involved a computer warrant.  (U.S. v. 
Hunter, fn. 70 – below)    
69  U.S. v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 232-36 (D. Me. 2011)  
 
70 U.S. v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998) involved a computer search 
warrant of records of an attorney who published a legal newsletter. The search 
raised both attorney-client privilege issues and Privacy Protection Act questions. 
The US Attorney for Vermont designated a team  consisting of an attorney and 
officers who were not involved in the criminal investigation (“taint team”) to 
conduct the search and sort out evidence that the investigating officers were 
authorized to view under the warrant.  
71 CDT II, 579 F3d 989, 1013 (Callahan, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, 
dissenting in part)  
72 Despite the apparent requirements of Rule 41 of the Vermont Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Condition 2 does not require the “independent expert” to be 
a law enforcement officer. 
73 The case is US v .Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Fla. 1995). The delay is 
reported in Black v. US,  172 FRD 511, 514 n.4  (S.D. Fla. 1997) 
74 172 FRD 516 
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75 New York State Police conducted the initial investigation and then gave 
information that they had to Burlington, Vermont Police because it appeared the 
person suspected of the crime lived in Burlington. In Re Appeal of Application 
for Search Warrant, No. 2010-479 (S. Ct. Vt. Filed December 29, 2010) PC 5-
11 
 
76  Id 
77 PC 6-7 
78  Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a 
Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches, 79 Fordham L. Rev. at  2856 
79  79 Fordham L. Rev. at 2857 
80 Id.  
